INDUSTRY FACT FILE · RENEWABLE ENERGY & ENERGY STORAGE

Threat Landscape: Top Cyber Threats Facing Renewable and Storage Operators

The 18 most relevant cyber threats, attacks and industry challenges for solar, wind, storage, asset management and smart metering operators.

Renewable fleets are distributed, remotely managed and dependent on OEM platforms and third-party connectivity. Attackers target vendor portals that can command many sites, exposed controllers with default credentials and update channels for inverters and meters—while supply-chain concerns focus on what equipment contains.

In February 2022, an attack on a satellite provider disrupted remote monitoring of about 5,800 German wind turbines; in 2019, a denial-of-service attack disrupted communications at a US renewable operator; and in 2025, US officials reported undocumented communication devices in some imported inverters.

The list below is a practical assessment framework, not a statistical ranking. Priority varies by business model, technology exposure and existing controls.

The matrix is a qualitative guide for prioritising the first round of security reviews.

Figure 5: Qualitative threat relevance by renewables segment (Codec Networks assessment).

4.1 Vendor clouds and fleet control

OEM portals let operators—and anyone with their credentials—adjust output across many plants. Shared logins without MFA are common.

• Questions to test: Does every user have a named account with MFA? Are fleet-wide commands approved and monitored? Has the OEM cloud been assessed?
• Relevant services: vendor cloud review, access controls, command monitoring.

4.2 Equipment and supply chain

Concerns about undocumented communication modules and insecure firmware make equipment inspection part of procurement.

• Questions to test: Is equipment inspected before deployment? Are communications allow-listed at sites? Do contracts include security requirements?
• Relevant services: equipment inspection, supply-chain assessment, site network allow-listing.

4.3 Exposed controllers and BMS

Site controllers, EMS and BMS interfaces are sometimes reachable from the internet with default credentials.

• Questions to test: Is external exposure scanned regularly? Are default credentials removed? Are safety interlocks independent of networked controls?
• Relevant services: exposure scanning, EMS/BMS testing, hardening.

4.4 Connectivity resilience

Remote sites depend on third-party links. Losing them removes monitoring and control.

• Questions to test: Are links diverse? Can sites operate safely without telemetry? Are connectivity providers assessed?
• Relevant services: connectivity resilience review, third-party assessment, resilience exercises.

4.5 Detection, reporting and the CEA Regulations

As reported, covered entities must report incidents to CSIRT-Power and CERT-In within six hours and run a 24-hour Information Security Division.

• Questions to test: Is the fleet monitored 24x7? Is there a crisis management plan with drills?
• Relevant services: fleet monitoring, playbooks, crisis plan and drills.

• CSIRT-Power and CERT-In: incidents reported within six hours under the CEA Regulations (as reported) and CERT-In Directions.
• CEA: covered entities must maintain crisis plans, audits and governance that incidents will test.
• Grid operators: incidents affecting scheduled generation require coordination.
• Offtakers and lenders: PPAs and financing agreements may require notification.
• Consumers: metering incidents involving personal data trigger DPDP obligations once breach provisions commence in May 2027.

• Are we covered by the CEA Regulations, and are we ready for 1 April 2027?
• Who can send commands to our fleet through OEM portals, and is MFA enforced?
• Have we inspected our inverters and controllers for undocumented communications?
• Are any site controllers, EMS or BMS interfaces reachable from the internet?
• Could our sites operate safely if remote connectivity were lost?
• Could we report an incident to CSIRT-Power and CERT-In within six hours?

Note: Threat descriptions and relevance ratings are general guidance, not findings about any specific organisation. Public incident references are summarised from widely reported events. CEA Regulation details are as reported.