INDUSTRY FACT FILE · LOGISTICS, WAREHOUSING & SUPPLY CHAINS

Five New Case Studies in Logistics and Supply Chain Security

Original 2026 case studies, each written as a blog post, showing how current threats play out in forwarders, 3PLs, couriers, warehouses and fleets and how Codec Networks services break the attack chain.

In this document 1.  About these case studies 2.  Case Study 1: The Forwarder That Went Dark 3.  Case Study 2: The Bank Account That Changed 4.  Case Study 3: The API Key in the Tracking Widget 5.  Case Study 4: The Warehouse That Stopped Picking 6.  Case Study 5: The Fleet That Could Be Seen by Everyone

These five case studies were written for this document set and have not been published elsewhere. Each is a composite scenario combining attack techniques and control failures widely observed in logistics and supply chains with the obligations that apply in India as of October 2026—in particular CERT-In's Directions and audit guidelines, SEBI disclosure for listed companies, DPDP, MoRTH and customs rules and the shipper requirements that reach Indian operators.

Important disclosure The organisations described are fictional and the scenarios are illustrative. They are not accounts of real incidents, and they are not Codec Networks client engagements or claims of achieved outcomes. Their value lies in showing how connected weaknesses form an attack chain, which controls break it, and which services test those controls.

Case study	Organisation type	Core threat	Regulatory lens	Primary bundles
1. The Forwarder That Went Dark	Freight forwarder and customs broker	Ransomware encrypting freight, customs and billing systems	CERT-In; Customs; shipper contracts	B3, B7, B8
2. The Bank Account That Changed	Contract logistics (3PL) provider	Business email compromise and freight payment diversion	CERT-In; contracts; banking	B10, B7, B3
3. The API Key in the Tracking Widget	Express and courier company	Partner API key leak and consignee data scraping	DPDP; CERT-In; marketplace contracts	B2, B7, B6
4. The Warehouse That Stopped Picking	Automated fulfilment centre operator	Vendor access and flat network halting automation and WMS	CERT-In; IEC 62443; shipper contracts	B1, B3, B9
5. The Fleet That Could Be Seen by Everyone	Trucking and fleet operator	Telematics platform compromise enabling cargo theft	MoRTH AIS 140; insurance; CERT-In	B11, B1, B7

The ships kept arriving. Nothing could be cleared, released or billed for eleven days.

At a glance
Organisation	A mid-sized freight forwarder and customs broker (“Fwdco A”) handling ocean and air imports for manufacturing and retail clients
Threat	Phishing leading to domain compromise and ransomware across the freight management, customs filing and billing systems
Why it is new	Forwarders cannot pause: cargo accrues demurrage every day the systems are down
Codec Networks services	Segmentation and backups, SOC, forensics (Bundles B3, B7, B8)

The scenario

A documentation clerk at Fwdco A opened a phishing attachment disguised as a shipping instruction. Over ten days the attackers escalated to domain administrator; EDR raised alerts that nobody watched at night.

On a Sunday night ransomware encrypted the freight management system, the customs filing workstations, the billing server and the backup server, which was domain-joined and online.

Containers for forty clients sat at the port while filings and delivery orders could not be processed. Fwdco A rebuilt systems from partial backups over eleven days, paying demurrage and detention on behalf of clients and losing two key accounts.

Figure 8: Illustrative attack path for Case Study 1 and the controls that break it.

What went wrong

• Backups were online and domain-joined, so they were encrypted too.
• Freight and customs systems shared the office network and credentials.
• EDR alerts were not monitored 24x7.
• No manual filing or release procedure had been rehearsed.

The impact

Fwdco A absorbed demurrage, detention and claims, paid recovery costs, reported the incident to CERT-In and faced customs scrutiny of delayed filings. Two shippers moved their business after invoking contract remedies.

The regulatory lens

• CERT-In Directions: incident reported within six hours; logs needed for investigation.
• Customs: delayed filings and releases triggered queries and penalties on behalf of importers.
• Shipper contracts: service-level and notification clauses invoked; one contract renegotiated with security requirements.

How Codec Networks would help

Need	Codec Networks response	Bundle
Separate and recover	Segmentation of freight and customs systems, immutable backups, tested restores and manual-operation playbooks	B3
Detect early	24x7 SOC with EDR monitoring and threat hunting	B7
Investigate and report	Forensics, root cause, CERT-In, customs and shipper reporting support	B8

Key lessons Keep backups immutable and off the domain. Segment the systems cargo depends on. Monitor EDR around the clock. Rehearse filing and releasing cargo without IT.

No malware, no ransom—just an email that looked exactly like the last fifty.

At a glance
Organisation	A 3PL (“Cargoco B”) running warehousing and transport for consumer-goods shippers, invoicing monthly by email
Threat	A compromised finance mailbox used to send bank-detail change notices from a look-alike domain
Why it is new	Freight is paid by invoice between parties who rarely meet, which makes payment diversion easy
Codec Networks services	BEC simulation and controls, SOC, email hardening (Bundles B10, B7, B3)

The scenario

A Cargoco B accounts receivable executive reused a password that had leaked elsewhere, and the mailbox had no MFA. Attackers logged in, created a forwarding rule and read invoice conversations with shippers for six weeks.

They registered a domain one letter different from Cargoco B's and emailed four shippers that the company had changed banks, attaching invoices identical to the genuine ones with new account details.

Three shippers paid. Cargoco B discovered the fraud only when it chased overdue invoices and the shippers produced the payment confirmations. The money had already moved through mule accounts.

Figure 9: Illustrative attack path for Case Study 2 and the controls that break it.

What went wrong

• No MFA on email accounts.
• Mailbox forwarding rules and foreign logins were not monitored.
• No procedure for verifying bank-detail changes by call-back on either side.
• Finance staff had never been trained against BEC patterns.

The impact

Cargoco B and its shippers disputed liability for the diverted payments, relationships were strained, banks recovered only a fraction, and Cargoco B reported the incident to CERT-In and the police.

The regulatory lens

• CERT-In Directions: unauthorised access to email reported within six hours of recognition.
• Contracts: shipper agreements were silent on payment verification and liability for diverted funds.
• Banking and police: recovery depended on rapid reporting through bank fraud channels.

How Codec Networks would help

Need	Codec Networks response	Bundle
Train and test	BEC simulation, finance team training, payment verification procedure design	B10
See it in time	Mailbox rule, login and payment anomaly monitoring in the SOC	B7
Harden identity and email	MFA, conditional access and domain protections such as DMARC	B3

Key lessons Enforce MFA on every mailbox. Monitor forwarding rules and unusual logins. Verify every bank-detail change by call-back. Put payment verification into shipper contracts.

The attackers never touched the courier's network. A merchant's website gave them the key.

At a glance
Organisation	A national express courier (“Shipco C”) delivering for marketplaces and D2C brands through merchant APIs
Threat	A merchant's embedded API key used to enumerate sequential shipment numbers and scrape consignee data
Why it is new	Couriers issue thousands of keys and shipment data is the raw material of delivery scams
Codec Networks services	Partner API testing, API monitoring, DPDP programme (Bundles B2, B7, B6)

The scenario

Shipco C issued each merchant an API key for booking and tracking. One D2C brand embedded its key in the JavaScript of its public order-tracking page.

Attackers extracted the key and found that shipment numbers were sequential and that the key could query any shipment. Over three weeks they pulled names, phones and addresses for millions of consignees.

A wave of messages followed, quoting real parcel numbers and asking consignees to pay a small customs or re-delivery fee or share an OTP. Shipco C's brand appeared in thousands of complaints before it understood the source.

Figure 10: Illustrative attack path for Case Study 3 and the controls that break it.

What went wrong

• Keys were not scoped to the issuing merchant's shipments.
• Sequential identifiers made enumeration trivial.
• No rate limiting or bulk-access detection on the tracking API.
• No merchant onboarding standard forbade embedding keys in public code.

The impact

Shipco C notified consignees and marketplaces, rotated every key, rebuilt its API authorisation model, reported the incident to CERT-In and faced marketplace penalties and customer churn.

The regulatory lens

• CERT-In Directions: data breach reported within six hours of discovery.
• DPDP: consignee personal data exposed; once in force, breach intimation and processor obligations to marketplace clients would apply.
• Marketplace contracts: security and notification clauses invoked.

How Codec Networks would help

Need	Codec Networks response	Bundle
Test the APIs	Partner API testing: authorisation, enumeration, rate limits, key scoping and rotation	B2
Watch for abuse	API monitoring for enumeration and bulk retrieval in the SOC	B7
Govern the data	DPDP programme: data mapping, minimisation, retention and breach workflow	B6

Key lessons Scope every partner key to its own data. Use non-guessable identifiers. Rate-limit and monitor tracking APIs. Set security standards for merchants who hold your keys.

The sorter stopped first. By midnight the WMS was gone too.

At a glance
Organisation	A fulfilment operator (“Wareco D”) running an automated multi-client centre with sorters and AS/RS for retail shippers
Threat	Malware from an automation vendor's laptop spreading across a flat site network to PLCs and the WMS
Why it is new	Warehouse automation has made 3PL sites OT environments without OT security
Codec Networks services	Warehouse OT assessment, segmentation, vendor risk (Bundles B1, B3, B9)

The scenario

Wareco D's automation vendor maintained a standing VPN into the site and connected engineers' laptops directly to the control network during visits. The WMS, sorter PLCs, scanners and office PCs shared one flat network.

During a peak-season visit an infected vendor laptop spread malware across the site. Sorter PLCs lost communication and the AS/RS halted; hours later ransomware encrypted the WMS server.

Picking stopped for two days at the height of the season. Shippers missed marketplace cut-offs and invoked penalties, and one moved volume to a competitor's site.

Figure 11: Illustrative attack path for Case Study 4 and the controls that break it.

What went wrong

• Standing vendor VPN and direct laptop connections to the control network.
• Flat network across WMS, PLCs, scanners and office IT.
• No OT asset inventory or monitoring to see the spread.
• WMS and PLC backups untested; no restart sequence documented.

The impact

Wareco D lost two days of peak output, paid shipper penalties, funded an independent assessment demanded by its largest client, reported the incident to CERT-In and re-architected its site network and vendor access.

The regulatory lens

• CERT-In Directions: incident reported within six hours; audit guidelines expect OT in scope.
• IEC 62443: zone-and-conduit and remote access requirements the site did not meet.
• Shipper contracts: penalties and an independent assessment requirement.

How Codec Networks would help

Need	Codec Networks response	Bundle
Assess the site	Warehouse OT assessment of WMS, PLCs, sorters and AS/RS with asset discovery and monitoring	B1
Segment and recover	Zone-and-conduit segmentation, brokered vendor access, backups and restart drills	B3
Govern the vendor	Automation vendor assessment, device standards and contract clauses	B9

Key lessons Treat the warehouse as an OT environment. Segment automation from WMS and office IT. Broker and record every vendor session. Back up WMS and PLC programs and rehearse restarts.

The thieves did not follow the truck. They watched it on the same dashboard the dispatcher used.

At a glance
Organisation	A trucking operator (“Fleetco E”) moving consumer electronics and pharmaceuticals under contract, with telematics on every vehicle
Threat	Default administrator credentials on the telematics platform used to track high-value loads and plan an interception
Why it is new	Telematics turns every truck into a connected endpoint whose data is as valuable as the cargo
Codec Networks services	Fleet and IoT assessment, platform testing, SOC (Bundles B11, B1, B7)

The scenario

Fleetco E rolled out AIS 140-compliant telematics across 600 trucks. The platform's administrator account kept the vendor's default password and was reachable from the internet; dispatchers shared one operator login.

A criminal group found the login, watched live locations and stop patterns of electronics loads for weeks and intercepted a truck at a predictable night halt. Investigators later found the attackers had also tested the platform's remote immobiliser command.

The cargo insurer disputed the claim pending evidence of controls, the shipper paused the contract, and Fleetco E discovered that months of platform logins had never been reviewed.

Figure 12: Illustrative attack path for Case Study 5 and the controls that break it.

What went wrong

• Default credentials and internet exposure on the telematics platform.
• Shared operator logins with no MFA or role separation.
• No monitoring of platform access or command use.
• Load and route data visible to every platform user.

The impact

Fleetco E lost a high-value consignment, faced an insurance dispute and a suspended contract, reported the incident to CERT-In and the police and rebuilt its telematics access model.

The regulatory lens

• MoRTH AIS 140 notifications: tracking devices and platforms are regulated equipment whose data must be protected.
• Insurance: cargo and cyber policies conditioned on access controls and monitoring.
• CERT-In Directions: unauthorised access reported within six hours of recognition.

How Codec Networks would help

Need	Codec Networks response	Bundle
Assess the fleet	Fleet and IoT security assessment of telematics platform, devices and remote commands	B11
Test the platform	Authentication, authorisation and exposure testing of telematics and driver apps	B1
Watch access	SOC monitoring of platform logins, command use and unusual data access	B7

Key lessons Change default credentials and remove internet exposure. Give every user a named account with MFA and a role. Monitor who looks at loads and who sends commands. Minimise who can see route and stop data.

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